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Abstract: The decline of agriculture in Taiwan has adversely affected the
incentives of farmers and the government to engage in irrigation management.
Despite that, Taiwan’s irrigation systems have shown a high degree of robustness.
This study seeks to understand how institutions have contributed to the
robustness of Taiwanese irrigation. Conceptualizing an irrigation system as a
social-ecological system (SES), this study examines the development and design of
Taiwanese irrigation institutions, and how these institutions have enabled farmers
and irrigation managers to cope with the dynamics in the SES, and hence
contributed to the system’s robustness.
The study has found that the robust systems are built upon institutions that
allow effective coordination of the activities of a multitude of farmers, enhance
the development and sustenance of a repertoire of ideas, and nest the
problem-solving efforts of various scopes and scales in a complementary manner.
The institutions enable individuals and organizations at different levels to engage
in continuous learning and adaptation that, in turn, facilitates the systems’
adaptation to the changing environment.
1. Robustness and change in Taiwanese irrigation
Taiwan’s irrigation sector has been facing a series of challenges in the
past decades. As the country’s economy has developed, agriculture has lost
its comparative advantage and become economically non-viable. The over-
production of paddy rice in Taiwan and worldwide has kept grain prices low; the
opening up of Taiwan’s agricultural producemarket to international competition
as a result of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO is going to make agriculture even
more difficult to sustain (AERC, 1999, 2000, 2001). The decline of agriculture
has driven the rural youth to cities, resulting in rapid ageing of the farming
population.1
An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Workshop on the Workshop III, June 2–6, 2004,
Indiana University, Bloomington. The research was supported by a grant (HKU7233/03H) from the Hong
Kong Research Grants Council.
1 As of 2001, more than 37% of the heads of farm households in Taiwan were over 65 of age (COA,
2003).
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The decline of agriculture has reduced the incentives of the Taiwanese
government and farmers to engage in irrigation management. As farmers do not
earn their main income from agriculture, they see little incentive to put resources
into collective action for irrigation management. As of 2000, agriculture
accounted for less than 3% of Taiwan’s GDP, though it used up almost 80% of
the country’s available water (COA, 2003).2 Questions have been raised as to
whether more water should be transferred to the domestic and industrial sectors.
Irrigation management is never a mere local, engineering issue. Particularly in
Taiwan, agriculture and irrigation has a long history of government involvement
(Stavis, 1974; Foster, 2001). Since the transformation of the Taiwanese polity
from an authoritarian regime to one of competitive party politics in the late
1980s, politicians have not hesitated to exploit issues of agriculture and irrigation
to advance their political interests (Lam, 2005).
Despite these challenges, irrigation in Taiwan remains in good shape.
Irrigation infrastructure is relatively well maintained, largely due to continual
investment by government and local Irrigation Associations (IAs); water
distribution and allocation in the field is kept in good order.3 Although active
voluntary labor can no longer be found, the social infrastructure that has evolved
over years of cooperation has not deteriorated too badly. The close links between
the Irrigation Associations and farmers remain relatively solid.4
At the national level, the irrigation sector has been successful in fending off
the demands for a transfer of water rights from agriculture to other sectors.
While politicization has generated uncertainties, the irrigation sector has been
able to resist the government’s attempts to tighten control. Unlike other East
Asian countries such as South Korea where the decline of agriculture has been
accompanied by the nationalization of irrigation institutions, Taiwan’s irrigation
sector is moving towards even higher degrees of self-governance and autonomy.
Taiwan’s irrigation systems have shown a high degree of robustness, which
refers to the maintenance of some desired system characteristics, despite
fluctuations in the behavior of its component parts or its environment (Carlson
and Doyle, 2002; Jen, 2002; Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2004). A question
2 As of 2000, the annual precipitation of Taiwan was 90.5 billion cubic meters; about 19.5 billion
cubic meters of water was available for use. About 15.4 billion cubic meters was used for agriculture.
3 The latest fieldwork was conducted in January 2004. With the cooperation of the Council of
Agriculture and the Agricultural Engineering Research Center, the author visited four of the 17 IAs
in Taiwan. The four IAs, namely Taoyuen, Chianan, Hualien, and Pingtung, are representative of major
hydrological and socio-economic types of irrigation systems in the country. During the visit, the author
interviewed IA staff, visited local working stations, met with Irrigation Group leaders.
4 During the fieldwork in early 2004, I conducted extensive interviews with government officials, IA
officials, IG leaders and ordinary farmers. I explicitly asked the interviewees to assess the degree of
farmers’ participation and involvement in IA activities. A majority of them agreed that, while active,
enthusiastic participation can no longer be found nowadays, the close working relationships among the
farmers and between the farmers and the IAs have not deteriorated. Whenever issues affecting the IAs
come up, farmers are willing to express their views and show concern.
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of major policy and theoretical interest is: In what ways have the Taiwanese
irrigation institutions enabled the systems to cope with the shocks, and to
adjust to the changing environment? In other words, what is the institutional
foundation of the robustness of Taiwanese irrigation? Conceptualizing an
irrigation system as a social-ecological system (SES), this study addresses the
question by examining the origin and development of Taiwanese irrigation
institutions, and how the institutions cope with the complexity in a SES.5
2. The political economy of Taiwanese irrigation: shocks and challenges
Government has played a dominant role in Taiwan’s economic development
(Liao, Huang, and Hsiao, 1986; Amsden, 1988; Moore, 1993). In the 1950s and
1960s, through a series of exploitative measures such as barter of fertilizer for
grains and compulsory grain purchases, the Taiwanese government extracted
surplus out of agriculture to help launch industrialization. By the late 1970s,
Taiwan’s industry took off. In the process of industrialization, agriculture lost
out. Taiwan’s agriculture is dominated by paddy rice.6 The overproduction of
paddy rice in Taiwan and worldwide, together with the decreasing demand for
staples as a result of economic development, has put tremendous pressure on
grain prices (Wu Huang, 1993; Pingali, Hossain, and Gerpacio, 1997). Since
1990, agriculture has accounted for less than 3% of Taiwan’s GDP.7
The structure of Taiwan’s agriculture is not conducive to diversification. Since
1990, the average landholding size of farm households in Taiwan has been less
than one hectare.8 The small landholding size prevents effective use of machines,
and renders infrastructure investment uneconomical. Although farmers cannot
earn a living by farming,9 they are generally unwilling to sell their lands and leave
agriculture.10 Farmers’ bond of land might be a reason, but many farmers expect
5 The study is based upon information collected in a series of fieldtrips to Taiwan in the last decade.
With the help from the Council of Agriculture, the IAs, and a number of funding agencies, the author has
been able to keep track of the development of Taiwanese irrigation by conducting regular visits to the IAs
every one to two years since the early 1990s.
6 Taiwan’s agricultural potentials are substantial due to high precipitations and the warm temperate
weather; the distribution of precipitation, however, is highly uneven. Much precipitation falls in the
summer; and water is very scarce in the winter. Without irrigation, farming is simply impossible in many
areas in the country. The rough topography of Taiwan is not conducive to irrigation. High gradients of
terrains together with short rivers result in rapid water flows and hence high wash-out rates.
7 In 1952, for instance, agriculture accounted for 32% of Taiwan’s GDP; the percentage dropped to
28.5% in 1960 (CEPD, 1996).
8 As of 2001, more than 92% of Taiwan’s farm households had a landholding size of less than 1
hectare.
9 As of 2001, the average annual income for farmers per capita was about NT224,000 (around
US$6,600 in 2001), which was around 70% of the average annual per capita income for non-farm
households.
10 As of 2001, there were about 726,000 farm households in Taiwan, which was about 10% of the
total number of households in the country. Such a percentage has remained quite steady. It is interesting
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that some day their lands might be re-zoned, which would mean a substantial
increase in land value. For farmers who derive their major incomes from non-
farm activities, they could afford to keep the lands and wait.
While agriculture has lost its economic viability, its importance in Taiwan’s
political economy remains. Ever since its inception, the Taiwanese government
has been in a dormant but confrontational relationship with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). To the Taiwanese government, a war across the
Taiwan Strait is not only plausible but inevitable; national security has always
been a paramount concern (Williams, 1994; AERC, 1999, 2000, 2001). Food
security is a key imperative underlying Taiwan’s agricultural policy.
To maintain food security, the government has to ensure that the agricultural
potential be preserved so that Taiwan has the ability to feed its population in
the case of embargoes. The government has promulgated zoning laws, which
strictly control changes of land use of paddy fields. In return, the government
has provided the farmers with a variety of subsidies, including guaranteed
procurement of grains at preferential prices, subsidies for fallowing, and
substantial rural infrastructure projects. The government has been subsidizing
the irrigation sector substantially. During the period from 1993 to 1997,
for example, government subsidy accounted for almost 70% of the total
expenditures of the IAs.11
The political economy of agriculture as described has impacts on irrigation
management at two levels. At the field level, unlike in the past when irrigation
water was an important production factor that could affect farmers’ income,
farming nowadays is considered a supplementary economic activity, which, in
many circumstances, is not for profit making but for keeping the farmlands
cultivable. Such a low-incentive mode of agriculture poses serious challenges to
Taiwanese irrigation management, which is built upon farmers’ participation
and farmer–government synergy.
At the sectoral level, as the irrigation sector becomes more reliant on
government subsidies, and farmers face little incentive to monitor the IAs, the
government feels obliged to impose tighter control to make sure that public mon-
ies are appropriately spent. Another challenge concerns water resource allocation
and utilization across sectors. Many have argued that, as the importance of agri-
culture decreases, more water should be transferred to domestic and industrial
uses. Irrigation officials and the IAs need to justify and defend their water rights.
While the macro political-economic changes have posed serious shocks and
challenges to Taiwanese irrigation systems, the systems have been able to cope
with the challenges, and retain a good level of vibrancy. How do we understand
to note that the total number of ‘full-time’ farm households, who derive their major income from farming,
has been on the rise in the last ten years. In 1992, there were about 100,000 full-time farm households in
Taiwan; by 2001, the number had increased to more than 140,000 (COA, 2003).
11 For detailed figures, see AERC (1999).
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the foundation of the robustness of Taiwanese irrigation? In particular, in what
ways have Taiwanese irrigation institutions contributed to the robustness?
3. The development of Taiwanese irrigation institutions
Taiwanese irrigation institutions are a product of both rational institutional
choices and the temporal dynamics of evolution. To understand how the
institutions have contributed to the robustness of irrigation systems, an analyst
needs to examine the historical development of the institutions so as to identify
the issues, concerns, and imperatives that underlayed, activated, and constrained
the institutions’ evolution (Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 2004). In particular, the
analyst needs to pay attention to the tensions embedded in the design of the
institutions, the reasons why alternative institutional designs were not adopted,
and the conditions for the stability and viability of the institutions and hence the
irrigation systems.
3.1. The origin of Taiwanese irrigation institutions
Government involvement in Taiwanese irrigation began when the island was
ceded to Japan at the end of the nineteenth century; before then irrigation
was largely a matter in the private domain. Colonial governance is by nature
extractive and exploitative; the Japanese were no exception (Ka, 1995). The
motive of the government’s intervention in irrigation was to increase Taiwan’s
agricultural productivity so that more resources could be generated for the
industrial and domestic needs of the Japanese homeland.
Like other colonial governments, the Japanese faced two fundamental
dilemmas. First, they had to secure the cooperation of the local population
without compromising the colonial government’s authority; second, they had
to maximize what they could extract from the colony without overdoing it
and hence provoking the local population. In irrigation management, these
dilemmas posed as the imperatives for institutional choice, which inevitably
limited the options of institutional design available to the colonial government.
Given the dilemmas, the colonial government adopted a parastatal insti-
tutional design featuring several characteristics. First, instead of nationalizing
existing irrigation systems that had been built and managed by local
communities, the government promulgated an executive order that irrigation
facilities deemed essential to the ‘public interest’ of agricultural developmentwere
to be put under the auspice of some corporate bodies called Irrigation Groupings
(the predecessors of the Irrigation Associations). While the Irrigation Groupings
were presumably farmers’ organizations, and were given an independent legal
status and a certain degree of autonomy, they were subject to close supervision,
monitoring, and assistance by the colonial government (Chen, 1997). Under an
Irrigation Grouping was a network of self-organizing Irrigation Groups (IGs),
which were responsible for managing daily operation and maintenance (O&M)
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below the sublaterals. Although the IGs did not enjoy any formal legal status,
they provided a broad institutional framework for farmers’ organizing efforts in
the field.
Second, the self-governing status of the Irrigation Groupings (and later the
Irrigation Associations) established common property rights of the irrigation
facilities. As farmers perceived themselves to be the owners of their Groupings
and systems, they were in general more willing to contribute to the construction
and management of irrigation facilities. In fact, many large-scale irrigation
projects initiated and spearheaded by the government would not have existed
without farmers’ generous contributions.12
Third, large-scale infrastructural development has always been a core
component of irrigation development in Taiwan. The design of Taiwanese
irrigation institutions, in particular the rules concerningwater delivery, have been
closely related to infrastructural and technological developments. For example,
the size and composition of Irrigation Groupings was largely correspondent
to the government’s efforts to consolidate small irrigation systems into larger
systems.
Fourth, in a colonial setting where the government needed to co-opt the local
elite, the parastatal design provided an ideal institutional infrastructure. From
the perspective of the colonial government, the parastatal organizations were
convenient arenas for managing the local elite. As long as the government was
able to manipulate the ways these organizations operated, it could maintain
political stability.
3.2. The development of Taiwanese irrigation institutions during the
Nationalist rule
After World War II and the Chinese civil war in the 1940s, the Chinese
Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) government fled to Taiwan. The resumption of
Chinese rule on the island inevitably triggered a process of institutional building
and restructuring at different levels of governance; it was the context in which
irrigation institutional changes took place.
When the Nationalists first arrived in Taiwan, they found themselves dealing
with an indifferent population who had little cognitive or affective bond with
the new government. The political repressions that followed further alienated the
Taiwanese locals. Ironically, the Nationalists found themselves facing a dilemma
similar to what the Japanese faced half a century earlier – on one hand, the
establishment of governance required the consent, or at least acquiescence, of
the locals; on the other hand, the government did not want to compromise its
authority. Moreover, a policy imperative of the government was to produce
enough paddy to feed the large number of migrants fleeing Mainland China. An
12 A famous example is Wushantou reservoir in the Chianan area.
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extractive agricultural policy was deemed a necessity, which further attenuated
its relations with the local farming population.
The Nationalist government found strengthening the existing parastatal
irrigation institutions suited their needs. It could reconcile the government’s need
to exert control over the local population on the one hand, and the imperative
to placate the local population so as to secure their cooperation on the other.
Also, the network of Irrigation Groups provided an effective means to infiltrate
and mobilize the rural communities.
The Irrigation Groupings were renamed Irrigation Associations; some
restructurings of the Irrigation Associations, such as merging some small IAs
into bigger ones, were undertaken to rationalize the IAs’ operation. Perhaps
the most important change was to give the IAs certain public mandates and
authority, and to turn them into ‘public entities’. Such a status differentiated the
IAs from other local organizations such as the Farmer Associations, putting the
IAs under closer government scrutiny (Chen, 1997).
The Nationalist government also adopted a series of measures to improve
agricultural productivity, including land reforms, farmland consolidation,
large-sale infrastructure projects, and agricultural procurement policies. The
implications of thesemeasures for irrigationmanagement and institutional design
were significant. First, farmland consolidation and large-scale infrastructure
projects made rotation irrigation on a large-scale possible. Effective practice of
rotation irrigation required the effective collective action of farmers in the field;
an institutional design that could facilitate farmers’ self-organizing effort became
imperative. Second, by putting in substantial inputs, the government became an
essential player in irrigation management. Unlike the colonial government who
sought to minimize involvement, the Nationalist government was not hesitant to
get involved. As government inputs increased, managing the farmer–government
partnership in irrigation management became a great challenge.
Taiwan’s irrigation institutions are not static. In particular, their self-
governing character has been subject to constant challenges. Over the years
the government has attempted to restructure or replace these self-governing
institutions. From the government’s perspective, the parastatal design is a two-
edged sword. While it allows the government to exert control without paying a
high cost, it poses the risk of authority leakage. The potential conflict between
control and autonomy is the tension inherent in the parastatal design.
The industrialization of Taiwan’s economy attenuated the tension. As farming
became less lucrative, the government found itself having to put in large amounts
of resources in the irrigation sector. The government had to make sure that
the money was well spent; the incentive to tighten control over the IAs was
substantial. The first attempt to tighten control took place in the 1970s, when
the government abolished the IA Chairman elections and turned the positions
into government appointments. The operation of the IAs was put under stringent
scrutiny, with a series of administrative measures taken to rationalize the IAs’
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financial and personnel procedures to improve the IAs’ operational efficiency.
Although the self-governing operation of the IAs was restored in the early 1980s,
the possibility of turning the IAs into a government agencywas seriously explored
as an alternative. In the early 1990s, the issue of whether the IAs should be turned
into a government agency (hence irrigation management be nationalized) was
again put on the political agenda. In 1993, a bill was passed in the legislature
stipulating that the IAs would be turned into government agencies in three years.
Although the bill was repealed by another bill in 1996, the tension between
government control and local governance drags on.
3.3. Dynamics of institutional evolution of Taiwanese irrigation
One could easily discard the various (failed) attempts to ‘nationalize’ the IAs
as merely a show of political maneuvering. Yet in each episode of the process
of (attempted) institutional change, individuals involved did ponder about the
viability of the existing as well as alternative institutional designs, before they
came up with the structural choice decisions. Examining the calculus underlying
these decisions can help identify issues and concerns underlying the institutional
design. It can also provide information for conducting thought experiments
on the viability of alternative institutional designs that were not adopted
(Tetlock and Belkin, 1996; Sylvan and Majeski, 1998). Moreover, each episode
of institutional change is a manifestation of the unfolding of the process of
institutional development. Examining these episodes allows us to identify the
mechanisms and dynamics underlying the institutions’ evolution (Griffin, 1992;
Buthe, 2002; Pierson, 2004).
The discussion of the possibility of turning the IAs into government agencies
resulted in heated debates and studies of the parastatal design, and also of the
viability of using a bureaucratic mode to manage irrigation (CAEA, 1995; Chen,
1996, 1999; Chen, S.C., 1997; AERC, 1999, 2000, 2001). From these studies,
one could summarize several arguments that the different actors involved in the
debates seemed to agree on. First, the IAs are built upon the concept of common
property. As the construction and development of much irrigation infrastructure
involved significant contribution from farmers and local communities, turning
the IAs into government agencies would infringe the property rights of the
communities.
Second, most of the IA staff do not possess the necessary educational
qualifications for the civil service status. Taking care of the IA personnel would
be an insurmountable challenge in any move to nationalize the IAs. Most studies,
however, did not portray the lack of educational qualifications to be a negative
attribute. Most of the IA staff come from local communities, who have worked
in the communities for an extended period of time. It is the experiences of
these IA staff and the close relationships that they have developed with the
local communities that help facilitate water delivery. In fact, the retirement of
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the more experienced staff has become a problem to many IAs.13 Given the
meticulous character of Taiwanese irrigation management, it is inconceivable
how a bureaucratic mode of management could manage the large array of
collective action in water delivery (Lam, 2005, 2006).
Third, nationalizing the IAs would require correspondent administrative
restructuring in the central government and, hence, incur high administrative
costs. In fact, the Irrigation Bureau in the Council of Agriculture (the Taiwanese
equivalent to a ministry of agriculture) was only established in 2004; before then
it was only a small section under the Bureau of Forestry. Changing the parastatal
mode to a bureaucratic mode would simply require a complete overhaul of the
government’s agricultural bureaucracy.
Fourth, although government input in the irrigation sector has been increasing,
nationalizing the IAs might not necessarily bring about a reduction of financial
burden. While some IAs are having serious financial problems, some others,
particularly those near the urban areas, have shown much entrepreneurship
in generating revenues (Lam, 2001, 2005). Nationalizing the IAs would only
narrow the revenue base for the irrigation sector.
Fifth, it has been strongly argued that the IAs embody the ideal of self-
governance that any democratic society should treasure. While problems exist in
the elections of chairmen and farmers’ representatives, they could be dealt with
by better institutions and election rules.
All these arguments suggest that, while the parastatal irrigation institutions
might not be perfect, the bureaucratic alternative would not have been more
viable, or better able to cope with the task of irrigation management. Moreover,
the development of Taiwanese irrigation institutions has shown a high degree
of path dependency. The parastatal institutions are heavily locked in – the
significant increasing returns effect tends to reinforce adaptation to the initial
institutional choice, rendering any shift to alternatives increasingly costly and
impracticable (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2004). Three mechanisms have played an
important role in generating the increasing returns.
The first mechanism is the common property rights upon which the IAs
are built. To many farmers, their irrigation systems are the product of the
contribution and collective efforts of their ancestors; and the IAs are the
institutional embodiments of the common property. There is a strong sense of
collective ownership among farmers, which has given them strong incentives
to preserve the IAs as a way to cling to the common property. Moreover,
13 Since the 1990s, the recruitment of staff of the IAs has been managed by the government. Applicants
are required to sit a public service examination to be considered for the IA jobs. A result is that many new
recruits in the last few years have had an education qualification and been younger in age. During my
fieldwork, however, both IA managers and farmers opined that the new recruits, while better educated,
do not have the necessary social skills and social networks to facilitate water delivery.
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the diffused nature of common property rights makes it very difficult for the
government to nationalize the irrigation institutions and systems.
The second mechanism is technological lock-in – the close relationship
between institutional design and irrigation technologies triggers the dynamics
of mutual reinforcement. While the institutions sustain the use and operation
of particular irrigation infrastructure or technology, the continual use and
investment in the infrastructure or technology makes the institutions more
asset-specific and difficult to change. As discussed above, Taiwanese irrigation
institutions are designed in conjunction with the development of irrigation
technologies. In particular, the operational needs of rotation irrigation have
largely determined the design of irrigation institutions and water delivery
procedures. In the Chianan area where rotation irrigation is most seriously
practiced, for example, effective water delivery depends on the ability of the
Irrigation Groups at the sublateral level to coordinate their schedules of water
delivery. To substitute for the farmers’ effort, if it ever be an option, would
require significant infrastructural input and restructuring, which would be
extremely costly and ineffective.
The thirdmechanism is institutional lock-in. Institutions tend to favor learning
of particular activities, and to reproduce behavior that is consistent with the logic
of the institutions. In water delivery, the parastatal institutions emphasize the
importance of local knowledge, networking, and embedding irrigation staff in
local communities. The institutions tend to encourage farmers and front-line IA
staff to reproduce water delivery rules and procedures for specific situations in
the same image, which further reinforce the perceived viability of the existing
institutions. Politically, the parastatal design embodies and continually reinforces
the concept of farmers’ ownership. Such a concept has been adamantly promoted
by local politicians and IA staff who have significant stakes in the survival of the
IAs.
Given that institutional change is not a purely rational process, there is no
guarantee that existing institutions are necessarily efficient (Pierson, 2004). An
interesting question, then, is what are the attributes of Taiwanese irrigation
institutions that have contributed to the robustness of Taiwanese irrigation
systems? In particular, an irrigation system is a social-ecological system involving
intricate relationships between and among human and biophysical elements.
How do the irrigation institutions enable the individuals involved to cope with
the complexity?
4. An irrigation system as a social-ecological system
An irrigation system can be conceptualized as a complex social-ecological system
(SES) in which human agents in different capacities and of different attributes
engage in continuous interaction in response to one another and the biophysical
environment (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom, 2004).
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Interactions among human agents give rise to emergent systemic attributes
that determine the system’s ability to adapt to the turbulent environment.
The potentials of human cogitation and strategic thinking further increase the
complexity involved in a SES. A SES is complex, epistemic, hierarchic.
4.1. A complex system
A complex system is constituted by a large number of autonomous units that
constantly interact with one another, as well as the environment of which they
are parts. A complex system has the process of self-organization built in. ‘Self-
organization is a process in which a pattern at the global level of a system
emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level components
of the system. Moreover, the rules specifying interactions among the system’s
components are executed using only local information, without reference to the
global pattern’ (Camazine et al., 2001). A complex system is complex not because
it involves a large number of units or rules; instead, complexity pertains to the
emerging systemic properties that are not present at the unit level.
An irrigation system is a complex system of which the working order is the
emergent systemic quality constituted by numerous decisions and actions of
actors of different capacities in disparate situations. A well-performed irrigation
system is characterized not only by a well-maintained infrastructure, but more
importantly a productive working order of farmers (as resource users) and
irrigation managers (as infrastructure providers). Such a productive working
order is an emergent pattern that is not the outcome of the command of a central
pacemaker.
Water in a system flows from the head end to the tail end through a network
of canals. The flow nature of water implies a high degree of interdependence
among individuals involved in irrigation (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Lam,
1998). While the task of irrigation management involves high degrees of
interdependence, decisions by individuals as to what to do in a particular
situation are often highly independent. For instance, a farmer at the head end
who tries to stop the water in a canal a little longer in order to divert a little
more water to his fields would unlikely be able to comprehend how his seemingly
trivial and innocent act might affect the operation of the system as a whole. The
challenge of coordination in such a complex setting is substantial (Lansing,
1991).
4.2. An epistemic system
A SES is activated by human beings who are able to (1) think and foresee
action–outcome links, (2) acquire and appreciate value and meaning of action,
and (3) learn and conduct trial-and-error. The architecture of human cognition
takes on an important role in understanding human choice and action in a
complex system (Simon, 1985; Jones, 2003). Individuals develop mental models
to frame the world as they see it. The mental models help individuals make
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sense of the world by (1) stipulating the definition of the problem at hand, (2)
constituting preferences, (3) laying out causal action–outcome relationships, and
hence possible alternative courses of action, and (4) specifying criteria for the
choice of alternatives. Choices are embedded in the prior question of how the
mental model is built in the first place.14 In a complex situation, rationality
cannot be assumed but has to be explained (Jones, 2003).
Several characteristics of mental model building are important to the
understanding of the SES. First, human beings’ abilities of empathy and engaging
in reciprocal interaction create the potential for developing mental models for
mutual betterment (Ostrom and Janssen, 2002). Mental models are embedded
in the broader cultural and social understanding of a community of individuals,
who share common experiences and predispositions of action (North, 1990).
Second, while a mental model simplifies, it also confines individuals’ vision.
Problems arise when a mental model no longer captures the essence of a problem
as the problem evolves. How to strike a balance between stability and change
affects the viability of individuals’ adaptive efforts (Denzau and North, 1994).
Third, human beings are endowed with the ability to imagine and to come up
with new ways of looking at their circumstances. When enough evidence about
the inadequacy of a particular model accumulates, the mental model in use could
be replaced.
The specific features of human cognition have implications for the study of
irrigation institutions in Taiwan. First, prior studies have shown that the success
of Taiwan’s irrigation management hinges upon a large array of diverse local
institutions developed by farmers in disparate local communities to cope with
irrigation problems that are location-specific and time-specific (Moore, 1989;
Lam, 1996a). As Denzau and North (1994) argue, institutions are simply mental
models externalized. What are the mental models in the repertoire that have
been drawn upon by the farmers in coping with the macro disturbances? Second,
institutions that help generate and maintain such a diverse repertoire of mental
models are instrumental to the robustness of the system. What is the design of
these institutions and how does it work? Third, a mental model is effective only
if it is shared and commonly understood by a community of individuals. What
is it in the Taiwanese system that makes the shared learning possible?
4.3. A hierarchic system
Simon (1962) defines a hierarchic system as one ‘that is composed of interrelated
subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we
reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem’. Different tasks involved in an
irrigation system might be of various scales in terms of scope and time (Ostrom
14 The perfectly rational model of man adopted by neoclassical economists and some rational choice
theorists can be considered to be a particular type of mental model in which individuals have a rather
clear idea about the problem situation.
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and Janssen, 2002). Farmers sharing waters from a lateral canal develop an order
of water distribution and appropriation. Such a local irrigation order is in turn
sustained by the larger concerns of managing the main canal and coordinating
the distribution of water among laterals. The management of the physical
infrastructure is in turn conditioned by the way irrigation management relates to
the broader issues of water resource management and economic development –
issues that are often managed in the context of national governance.
Several features of the multi-scale character of a hierarchic system are
particularly important. First, structures and processes of different scales on
different levels tend to have very different spatial and temporal attributes.
For instance, irrigation at the tail end of a channel operates on a cycle very
different from that at the head end, and even more different from the operation
pattern of the larger channel. The operation of a SES involves institutional
arrangements of multiple scales, each with different design imperatives. Second,
structures and processes at different levels tend to affect one another. Usually
the slower, larger levels constrain the behavior of the faster and lower levels
(Gunderson and Pritchard, 2002). The operation of the channel that delivers
water from a reservoir to laterals is likely to affect the operation of the systems
that receive water from the laterals. Also the robustness of one level does not
necessarily enhance the robustness of another level. For instance, subsystems
that keep absorbing shocks at the local level tend to reduce the vigilance of the
larger system. The synchronization of processes at different levels is of major
importance.
5. Coping with complexity in Taiwanese irrigation
To attain a productive working order in irrigation requires that the dynamics
embedded in the complex system be harnessed effectively (Axelrod and Cohen,
2000). The design of Taiwanese irrigation institutions has, to a large extent,
allowed the irrigation systems to cope with such dynamics by dealing with the
tasks of coordination, repertoire building, and nesting.
5.1. Coordination
Amajor feature of Taiwan’s irrigation institutions is that they provide arenas and
support for problem solving by farmers at the local level. Farmers are organized
into self-organized Irrigation Groups (IGs), which are responsible for O&M in
the field. Farmers in an IG elect an IG leader, who is given the mandate to
coordinate and liaise with IG members concerning O&M activities. In some
IGs, water guards are hired to help on water allocation and minor maintenance
works.
The IGs are organized on the basis of hydraulic boundaries. In Taoyuan areas
where a large number of ponds were in place for water storage, for example, the
IGs are organized in accordance with the areas irrigated by individual ponds. By
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matching the boundaries of the IGs with hydraulic areas, the task of irrigation
management is effectively compartmentalized into subtasks. That farmers at the
local level are allowed to work out solutions to cope with ‘localized’ irrigation
problems enables better utilization of local information. By the nature of its
proximity to the local community, the IGs can draw upon social capital that has
already been developed in the local community to attain coordination in O&M
(Lam, 1996a).
While the IGs enhance clustering among farmers within particular hydraulic
areas, how IGs connect with one another affects the overall performance of
the system as a whole. Closely knit communities are often fragile in dealing
with external shocks or changes on a large-scale, and might not be consistent
with one another in pursuing larger-scale collective actions (Buchanan, 2002;
Watts, 2003). Research on ‘small world phenomena’ suggests that random links
developed between individuals belonging to different communities can provide
the glue that drastically shortens the social distance between the communities,
hence reconciles clustering and connectedness. The random links do not have
to be strong; the mere existence of these links serves a miraculous function of
linking up closely knit communities.
In Taiwan, two institutional arrangements are in place to connect the clustered
groups (the IGs). The first is the annual irrigation plans worked out by the IAs as
the blueprints for water delivery. While the plans are so meticulous that even the
amount of water allocated to a particular patch is specified, they are often not
strictly followed in actual water distribution. These irrigation plans, however,
serve a very important coordination function. The amounts of water to particular
fields as specified in these plans are considered farmers’ entitlements of water,
which serve as the benchmark around which adjustments be made. These plans
provide a mental map for farmers to engage in mutual adjustments.
Second, random links are put in place to bridge the IG leaders and the frontline
staff of the IAs. The IAs’ working stations in the field hold regular IG leaders
meetings twice a year, usually scheduled for the time right before irrigation
begins. Ad hoc meetings will also be held in case of emergencies. Whether these
meetings can provide an effective arena for decision making and deliberation
has been questioned. Anyone who has observed these meetings would agree that
they are more like social gatherings and largely dominated by IA officials. Very
often the attendance rate is low. Despite that, these meetings shorten the social
distance between the IGs so as to enhance coordination and provide access to
learning from one another (Watts, 1999, 2003). Other than the meetings, the
IG leaders are also engaged in various social activities organized by the IAs. For
example, every year an irrigation festival is organized at which some ‘model IG
leaders’ will be given awards; also an IG leader is entitled to an ‘overseas field
trip’ during his term of service to broaden his horizons. All these seemingly trivial
and irrelevant activities help sustain the connectedness among the IG leaders and
hence the IGs.
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Coordination in water delivery in Taiwan is maintained not by a grand plan
or a pacemaker, but by an array of institutional arrangements that encourage
local problem solving on the one hand, and local mutual adjustments on the
other. The situation in Chianan provides a good case for illustration. In Chianan
areas, irrigation water mainly comes from large reservoirs; rotation irrigation
is practiced. The changing economic setting has triggered the development of
a large array of rules to cope with the impact of macro-economic changes in
disparate locations. While the farmers have not succeeded to adapt in every
circumstance, some interesting systemic patterns can be observed. In general,
farmers (and their IGs) in different locations along a canal would assess the
profitability of farming (based upon their knowledge on the cropping patterns
of their fields and the market situation) to work out different water allocation
practices that require different levels of involvement and input on their part. Such
flexibility of the institutions can cope with the low incentive mode of agriculture
on the one hand, and retain a certain level of vibrancy in irrigation management
on the other.
The viability of the flexible institutional arrangements in Taiwan depends on
the IG leaders who are willing to coordinate farmers in local communities. A
(de)stabilizing factor for the robustness of Taiwanese irrigation is whether the
commitment and experiences of the IG leaders can be retained, strengthened,
and reproduced. The IAs are aware of their importance, and have in recent years
adopted measures to beef up the support and incentives for the IG leaders. In
Taoyuan IA, for example, the IG leaders are allowed to operate aquaculture
in the ponds that store irrigation water for the IGs. Profit from aquaculture
provides additional incentives for the IG leaders to keep their posts. Other than
material incentives, efforts have been made to strengthen the connectedness of
IG leaders. In Taoyuan, the IG leaders are organized into associations. Also each
managerial staff of the IA is required to visit the working stations at least twice
a year. Although many IGs are not as active as in the past, the role of the IG
leaders has become increasingly important for coordination.
A caveat is warranted, however, that the IAs’ effort to adapt to the changing
environment is not successful in every instance. Research has shown that IAs
with different social-economic backgrounds tend to have different degrees of
success in coping with change (Lam, 2001). Generally speaking, the IAs that
have fewer endowments in terms of properties and financial resources tend to
have a tougher time in the process of adjustment. The research has also found
that farmers are in general less able and willing to adapt to change in systems
where water is scarce and farmers have little control over the supply of irrigation
water.
5.2. Repertoire building and learning
As discussed above, boundedly rational individuals make sense of the world by
resorting to shared mental models that provide the assumptions and theories
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explaining the world. A robust SES should be able to generate and maintain a
variety of mental models that could possibly be drawn upon for various problem
situations.
Taiwanese irrigation systems are knowledge-rich. Knowledge generated in
the process of irrigation management is systematically recorded and stored
in handbooks and documents at different jurisdiction levels of the irrigation
sector. These handbooks and documents, of course, do not necessarily provide
the solution to every problem at hand; there have been instances in which
farmers and irrigation managers were bewildered by exigencies that they had
never encountered before. Yet the knowledge recorded in the handbooks does
constitute a repertoire of ideas that provide the building blocks for working
out mental models. The practice of water stoppage during droughts is a case
in point. The basic idea, as recorded in the handbook, is that prolonging the
irrigation cycle by a few days could reduce water use without doing harm to the
crops. Yet exactly how long the water should be stopped, how water stoppage
can fit in rotation irrigation, and how water stoppage should be managed would
all depend on the physical as well as institutional setting of particular systems.
During my fieldwork, I found a variety of water stoppage rules used in different
IGs. There is also a high degree of cross-community learning.
Mental models concern not only the physical and operational dimensions of
irrigation management, but also broader issues such as the orientation of the
irrigation sector in the new political economic setting. The IAs are not merely
engineering agencies, they are parastatal organizations owned by farmers, staffed
by professional engineers and managers, controlled by local politicians, and
supported and supervised by the government (Lam, 1996a). Such a combination
of expertise enables the IAs to address irrigation management not only from
an engineering perspective, but also from social and policy perspectives. Such
capacity is particularly important in the context where not only individual IAs
but also the whole irrigation sector is looking for a niche to re-orient itself.
So when the IAs were asked to generate revenues, they could easily come up
with such innovative ideas as partnering up with a power company to engage in
hydraulic power generation.
Of course, the institutional design that includes individuals of different
expertise and backgrounds does not always work to enhance irrigation
management and the IAs. In fact, a (de)stabilizing factor affecting the robustness
of Taiwanese irrigation is whether various interests involved in the IAs can be
reconciled.When local politicians who control the IAs operated the organizations
solely as a political mobilization machine, and farmers were unable to monitor
and control these politicians effectively, one would expect a drastic loss of
vibrancy of the institutions and the systems.
5.3. Nesting
To cope with the multi-scale nature of irrigation management, irrigation
institutions serving activities of different scales at different levels are nested
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within one another. As mentioned, the IGs are organized around hydraulic (at
the sub-lateral level) and community boundaries; above the IGs are working
stations that are organized to cover a number of IGs, in accordance with larger
hydraulic boundaries (at the lateral level). The IA headquarters oversee the
overall irrigation management in particular regions. While each unit is given
the task and much autonomy in managing irrigation in a particular area, it is at
the same time supported and covered by a higher-level unit that manages a task
of a larger scale (Moore, 1989; Lam, 1996a).
The nesting arrangements enhance complementarity and embeddedness (Lam,
1996a). Complementarity refers to the mutually beneficial division of labor
among individuals in different capacities. Tasks of different scales call for
different expertise and resources. For example, while the IGs might be able
to help fix small leaks in canals, larger-scale maintenance works need to be dealt
with by the working stations or even the headquarters.
Complementarity keeps the system flexibly decomposable. Units in a system
could easily be re-grouped into units of different scales to cope with problems of
different scopes. Managing water allocation in droughts is a good case in point.
Depending on the scale and seriousness of the drought, rotation of different
types involving working units of different scales could be adopted. When water
shortage is mild and considered temporary, rotation in the form of farmers
within an irrigation block taking turns to receive water would suffice. More
serious water shortage might require that irrigation blocks take turns to receive
water. When droughts happen, rotation might be practiced on the basis of areas
irrigated by laterals. If the drought persists, rotation would be conducted on the
basis of river systems.
Complementarity also serves as the safety valve that makes the system more
robust to external shocks. The simplest form of safety valve is putting a
certain degree of redundancy in place (Costanza et al., 2001). For example,
instead of relying on the IG leaders to patrol the canals, the working staff
will also do the patrolling. Another form of safety valve is substitution. For
instance, one major strategy of the IAs to cope with the decreased incentive
and input of farmers in irrigation management is to maintain the infrastructure
as well as possible, so as to reduce the demand for farmer’s input (Lam,
2005). Safety valves can also take the form of larger units providing buffers to
smaller units. A most illustrative example of a buffer is the option of fallowing
provided by the government. By absorbing farmers’ risk, the fallowing option
puts bounds on the demand for irrigation management, and avoids extreme
situations.
Embeddedness refers to the intertwining of processes and rules that creates
added value for the processes. For example, the IG leaders are responsible for
water distribution at the field level. Yet there are situations in which water is
very scarce or serious feuds between farmers exist; the moral authority wielded
by the IG leaders alone might not suffice. Under these situations, the staff from
the working stations or even the IA headquarters will back up the IG leaders to
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patrol the canals. The presence of the IA staff enhances the IG leaders’ authority
in discharging their duties.
Sometimes embeddedness takes the form of units at a higher level controlling
excesses by units at a lower level. As mentioned, a major challenge facing
Taiwan’s irrigation institutions has been the changing nature of the IAs. As
farmers face little incentive to get involved in irrigation management and are
getting increasingly detached, the IAs are becoming farmers’ organizations
without farmers’ involvement. The IA staff and the politicians who control the
IAs become the de facto owners of the associations. Such a change threatens
the viability of the IAs whose design is based upon the assumption of farmers’
ownership (Lam, 2005).
To maintain the viability of the IAs, the government has adopted policy
measures that set the boundaries for the operation of the IAs and henceminimized
the extent of possible rent-seeking activities. These measures have been mainly
focused on two areas. The first is the imposition of financial prudence. The IAs are
not allowed to spend the money they earn from property sales on activities other
than irrigation. Also the amount of subsidies to the IAs is tightly controlled.
The second is to work out better laws and regulations for the operation of
the IAs. Instead of relying solely on administrative control as before,15 the
government has been trying to codify rules and laws that could provide a better
legal framework for the operation of the IAs (AERC, 2003).
6. Discussion
In much of Asia in the last two decades, rapid economic development and
urbanization have brought about significant changes to the macro political-
economic context in which irrigation is managed. The question of what can
be done to help the irrigation systems to cope with the changes and to retain a
certain level of vibrancy is of major academic and policy interest (Shivakoti et al.,
2005). This study has looked into the experience of Taiwanese irrigation, which
has shown a high degree of robustness to shocks and disturbances brought about
by macro political-economic changes. Conceptualizing an irrigation system as a
social-ecological system (SES), this study has examined the development and
design of Taiwanese irrigation institutions, and how these institutions have
enabled farmers and irrigation managers to cope with the dynamics in the SES,
and hence contributed to the systems’ robustness. Important features of the
institutions are summarized in Table 1.
15 In the past, the interaction between the IAs and the central government was mainly through
administrative orders by the government. A consequence was that, while the IAs tended to rely on
the government for decisions; the government found itself not having sufficient resources to exercise
effective control and this created administrative bottlenecks.
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Table 1. Institutional features that enhance system robustness
Imperatives for Coping with the Dynamics
of Irrigation Systems as SES Features of Taiwanese Irrigation Institutions
1. Coordinating a Large Number of Strengthen the clustering of farmers by:
Autonomous Agents (Irrigator-Farmers) • matching the boundaries of problem-solving units,
i.e. the Irrigation Groups (IGs), with hydraulic
boundaries;
• allowing high degrees of autonomy to the IGs.
Strengthen the connectedness among clusters by:
• working out irrigation plans to serve as the
framework for interactions among the IGs;
• developing social networks among IGs leaders;
• putting in place ties between IG leaders and
irrigation officials through regular yet infrequent
rotation of irrigation staff.
To cope with macro political-economic changes, the
clustering and connectedness have been enhanced by:
• allowing institutional adjustments by the IGs;
• strengthening the role of IG leaders and their
networks.
2. Coping with the Limits of Human Build a repertoire of mental models by:
Cognition • facilitating systematic information gathering at both
the working stations and the IGs;
• codifying scenarios and relevant operational rules for
irrigation management.
Facilitate learning by:
• allowing the IGs the flexibility of drawing upon and
making adjustment to codified operational rules;
• encouraging cross-community learning in irrigation
and farming matters.
Putting in place a diversity of ideas by:
• including individuals of different backgrounds and
expertise in the Irrigation Associations (IAs).
To cope with macro political-economic changes,
repertoire-building and learning have been
strengthened by:
• further codifying and strengthening operational rules
for irrigation management.
3. Managing Multiplicity of Scales of Put in place multi-level governance by:
Problems • matching problems of different scales with
organizational units at different levels of jurisdiction;
• defining clearly the degree of autonomy and
responsibilities for organizational units at different
levels.
To cope with the nesting of problems of different scales,
complementarity between organizational units at
different levels is attained by:
• keeping irrigation institutions flexibly decomposable;
• putting in place certain degrees of redundancy as
well as substitutability of organizational units at
different levels;
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Table 1. Continued
Imperatives for Coping with the Dynamics
of Irrigation Systems as SES Features of Taiwanese Irrigation Institutions
• having organizational units at higher jurisdiction
levels provide buffer for units at lower levels.
Embeddedness of organizational units at different levels is
also put in place by:
• intertwining the processes and operation of
organizational units at different levels;
• having organizational units at higher levels control
possible excesses by units at lower levels.
To cope with macro political-economic changes, the
nesting of organizations has been strengthened by:
• specifying a clearer framework for the operation of
local irrigation institutions;
• the government imposing a high degree of financial
prudence on the IAs;
• working out more detailed legal frameworks for the
interaction between the IAs and the government.
The major lesson from the Taiwanese experience is that a robust irrigation
system is built upon institutions that allow effective coordination of the activities
of a multitude of farmers, enhance the development and sustenance of a
repertoire of ideas, and nest the problem-solving efforts of various scopes and
scales in a complementary manner. These institutions enable individuals and
organizations at different levels to engage in continuous learning and adaptation
that, in turn, facilitates the systems’ adaptation to the changing environment.
The lesson, however, goes beyond irrigation management. The issues
addressed in this study – institutional design, the dynamics of institutional
development, and complexity – are pertinent to the more general question of how
individuals cope with complexity in a social-ecological system. A complex system
is composed of a large number of mutually adapting human and biophysical
elements whose rich patterns of interactions produce emergent properties that
are not easy to predict (Ostrom, 2005). Many social systems and policy problem
situations can be characterized as a complex system. Hence, an appreciation
of the role and meaning of complexity, and a good understanding of how
institutions can help cope with complexity are fundamental to policy analysis
and action.
A note of caution, however, is warranted. While the Taiwanese experience
offers good insights, it would be naı¨ve to construe the Taiwanese irrigation
institutions as the magic recipe for effective management of irrigation or
SES, which could be easily transplanted to other settings. Institutions exist in
particular historical junctures characterized by specific temporal and contextual
features (Griffin, 1992; Hill, 1997). The discussion above has shown that the
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Taiwanese irrigation institutions are a product of not only rational institutional
choices, but also the opportunities and constraints embedded in particular
historical contexts and the temporal dynamics such as the lock-in effects.
The robustness of Taiwanese irrigation hinges upon a number of stabilizing
and destabilizing factors. Perhaps the most important one is the existence of a
certain level of commitment and the participation of farmers. While institutional
design can help reduce the demand for farmers’ commitment and self-organizing
effort, it is no perfect substitute. When farmers totally retreat from the tripartite
endeavor, and irrigation management becomes the battle of the sexes between
the government and IA officials, the collapse of the system can be expected.
With the decline of agriculture and the increasing politicization of irrigation
management, learning has become more confusing. Sometimes farmers could get
stuck in a mental model that may provide short-term benefits for individuals
but cause long-term damage to their systems. Perhaps the best example is
the controversy concerning membership fees (Lam, 2005). When irrigation is
portrayed as merely one type of public service that the government should
provide for free, farmers and IA officials are getting more and more dependent;
and tend to dwell on strategies that seek rent from the government.
Complementarity and embeddedness have enabled Taiwan’s irrigation
systems to adapt and adjust to the changing environment. Both complementarity
and embeddedness, however, have their limits. When infrastructure is considered
to be able to replace farmers’ effort, and when IA staff are thought to be
able to replace the IG leaders, the vibrancy of the system could easily be
undermined (Lam, 1996b, 2001, 2005). What is more unfortunate is that
individuals might not be even aware of the loss at first. When the deterioration
reaches the threshold, cascading effect in terms of rapid deterioration could
happen. Particularly, embeddedness would work only if the IAs remain vibrant
and autonomous entities. When they are so embedded with the government that
they lose their autonomy and self-organizing capacity, they could become de
facto subordinate organizations of the government.
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